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I

The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953-61, seemed
to many Americans to be an "era of good feeling."

The harsh

divisions over the Korean War and McCarthyism had been healed,
and the country enjoyed peace and prosperity; "I like Ike"
was more than just a political slogan--it was a national
sentiment.
Yet, to the liberals in America, Eisenhower seemed to be
merely a latter-day McKinley.

To the liberals, this peace and

prosperity was a euphemism for the stagnation and drift caused
by the inaction of the Eisenhower Administration.
With a growing urban and racial crisis, the President's
sole domestic concern was achieving a balanced budget.

For

all the grandiose Cold War rhetoric of John Foster Dulles, the
Atlantic alliance had been weakened, and Communism appeared
to be making dangerous inroads in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America.

In the areas of education, scientific achievement,

and economic growth, America was lagging behind the Soviet
Union.

In an age which cried out for bold, creative action,

the U. S. Government responded like a tired, flabby businessman.
As the decade came to a close, there was a certain uneasiness about U. S. goals, or what was generally called "national
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purpose."

Questions were raised as to whether America's

abundant material wealth had produced a softness in the
national character.
Diplomat George F. Kennan delivered a speech in 1959
which was indicative of liberal thinking.

Discussing the

present condition of the U. S. A., he made a somber statement:
If you ask me.
.whether a country in
the state this country is in today.
has, over the long run, good chances of
competing with a purposeful, serious, and
disciplined society such as that of the
Soviet Union, I must say that the answer
is "no." l
So, to most American liberals, with their terrible sense
of urgency, the only person to lead the

u.

S. out of this

quagmire of inaction and complacency was the man described by
Senator Eugene McCarthy as the "prophet" of the 1950's'!
Adlai E. Stevenson.

II
In December, 1956, Adlai Stevenson stated publicly:
"I will not again run for the Presidency. 112

At the time, that

statement seemed academic, as Stevenson had just suffered a
second crushing defeat.
During the years following 1956, Stevenson's political
activities were largely confined to speaking at Democratic
Party functions to pay off the Party debt and to serving on
the Democratic Advisory Council, which set forth policy alternatives to the Republican Administration.

On the whole,

though, he devoted his time to his lucrative law practice.
However, his old supporters were beginning to stir.

As

leader of the Party in the Fifties, Stevenson had inspired an
almost religious devotion from liberal Democrats.

These

people were not professional politicians; they were, generally
speaking, people who had been drawn into politics in 1952, had
labored tirelessly for Stevenson in two campaigns and were prepared to do so again.

It was here that Stevenson had a strong

base of support for a possible candidacy.
In 1959, "Draft Stevenson" clubs were formed in six
states and in the District of Columbia.
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During this period,

formal sort of organization was set up by Stevenson
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supporters across the nation:

from Wisconsin, whose Demo-

cratic organization had always been strongly for Stevenson,
James Doyle gave supervisory advice to the ''Draft Stevenson"
clubs in the country; in New York, the reform Democrats,
closely tied to Eleanor Roosevelt and Herbert Lehman, hired
William Attwood (foreign editor of Look magazine) to research
and prepare speech material for a possible Stevenson candidacy; in the Los Angeles area, film producer Dore Schary raised
funds to promote Stevenson; and in Washington, D. C., lawyer
George Ball and Senator A. S. Mike Monroney of Oklahoma formulated the basic strategy to win the Democratic nomination for
Stevenson.
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The backers of the "Draft Stevenson" movement knew that
there was no scarcity of competition for the Democratic nomination.

The Stevenson supporters felt, however, that each of

the declared--or potential--candidates had certain liabilities
which would be hard to overcome:
1) Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, a
dedicated liberal, was regarded as a wildeyed radical by conservative Democrats and
was anathema to the South;
2) Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts
had unlimited financial resources and was
a proven vote-getter in the industrial
Northeast, but it was felt that his youth
(42), religion (Catholic), and lack of
experience would hinder him in the South
and West;
3) Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri was
an expert on national defense but largely
incoherent on any other issue, and he had
no grass-roots following;
4) Senator Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas, the
powerful Majority Leader of the Senate,
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was believed to be a regional candidate,
having very little support outside the
Southern and border states.
None of these men possessed the national appeal, stature,
or prestige of Stevenson, nor did any have his experience in
domestic and foreign affairs.

The Stevenson strategists de-

cided to present their man as the mature, experienced statesman as opposed to these pygmy politicians interested in mere
votes.

Ball and Monroney wanted Stevenson to be the liberal

voice of the Democratic Party, defining positions on the various
issues, while the others engaged in bitter intra-party
.
5
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Stevenson was more inclined to discuss policies than
politics anyway.

Early in 1960, he took a stand on two con-

troversial issues, stating that he favored compulsory arbitration in labor disputes, 6 and that he favored admission of Red
China to the United Nations ("It is clear that no general
control of disarmament has any value unless it includes China,
and it is difficult to see how China can accept international
control when it is not, formally, a member of international
society") .

7

In February, Stevenson embarked on a two-month

"self-education" tour of Latin America.
He was aware that 1960 represented his last opportunity
to be President, yet he remained curiously aloof, not actively
working for the nomination, allowing Ball and Monroney to
struggle as best they could.

Why was this?

First of all,

Stevenson took seriously his 1956 statement that he would not
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seek the Presidency again; he had restated this many times
to party leaders since then.

Thus, he felt pledged to a

position of neutrality.
Secondly, he was unwilling to go through the ordeal of
waging an intra-party struggle for the nomination.

In 1952,

Stevenson, then the Governor of Illinois, had been drafted
by the convention--perhaps the only genuine draft in this
century; in 1956, alarmed at the policies of the Eisenhower
Administration and convinced that he alone possessed sufficient weight to challenge the President, Stevenson sought
and won the nomination again, but only after a bruising battle
in the primaries and with various party leaders.

He was de-

termined not to campaign for the nomination again; however,
as a close friend said:

"Deep down he wants it.

wants the convention to come to him."

But he

8

Senator Monroney described the dilemma in which Stevenson
found himself.

Stevenson thought that he must honor his

neutrality pledge, but, because he hoped for a draft by the
convention, he would not disavow the efforts of those who
were working for his nomination.
vented an active candidacy.
a graceful withdrawal.
this dilemma." 9

"The first commitment pre-

The second commitment prevented

Our cause was to founder solely on

So Stevenson did nothing.

In planning their tactics, Stevenson's supporters rightly judged Kennedy to be the greatest threat to their man's
chances.

Their strategy therefore centered around a "stop

7

Kennedy" movement.

Kennedy, to overcome his handicaps of
H40 Io

Go

youth and religion, -m\1-&E "9B to the convention in Los Angeles
with the image of an irresistible winner, having a string of
primary victories behind him.

Humphrey and Kennedy were to

be opponents in several spring primaries.

Even if Humphrey

won all of his primaries, which was highly unlikely, he still
could not win the nomination; on the other hand, if Kennedy
could be upset in just one primary, it might destroy his
"winner" image.

Based on this reasoning, Stevenson's sup-

porters gave financial aid to Humphrey, hoping that he could
frustrate Kennedy and thereby benefit Stevenson.
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Unfortunately for them, their plans went awry.

Kennedy

beat Humphrey rather decisively in Wisconsin--Humphrey's own
backyard--and then gave Humphrey a terrible beating in West
Virginia; as a result of his humiliating trouncing there,
Humphrey withdrew from the Presidential race.

Within ten

days after Humphrey's withdrawal, Kennedy coasted to victories
in Nebraska, Maryland, and Oregon.

11

Stevenson, in the meantime, had returned from South
America in April and had castigated the Eisenhower Administration for its neglect of the area.

A few days after his return,

he spoke at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville on
the eve of Jefferson's birthday.

There he compared the

Jeffersonian ideals with the America of 1960 and gave a scathing
indictment of the Republican Administration:

"Our foreign

policy has been dominated by sterile anti-Communism and wishful thinking, our domestic policy by fear of inflation and

mistrust of government."

12
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Stevenson went on to ask

why we have lost our once unquestioned military
superiority;
why we have repeatedly allo~ed the Soviets to
seize the diplomatic inlative;
why we have faltered in the fight for disarmament;
why we are not providing our children with the
education to which they are entitled;
why--nearly a century after the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments--all of our citizens
have still not been guaranteed the right
to vote;
why we spend billions of dollars storing surplus
food when one-third of humanity goes to
bed hungry;
why we have not formulated an economic development
program geared to the world-wide passion
for economic growth;
why we have failed to win the confidence and
respect of the billions of impatient people
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America;
why millions of Americans lead blighted lives
in our spreading urban slums;
why we have fewer doctors per capita than we did
fifty years ago and pay more for our medical
care than ever before;
why we spent more money last year on tranquilizers
than on space exploration, and more on leisure
than on learning;
why the richest nation in the history of the world cannot support the public services and facilities we
must have not only for world power but for national
growth and opportunity?l3
To anyone who doubts Stevenson's impact on the Democratic
Party, this catalogue of demands was to be the artillery for
John Kennedy's successful assault of the White House.
However, Stevenson might as well have been speaking in a
vacuum, as Kennedy seemed assured of the nomination after his
primary victories.

But Premier Khruschev cast a dark shadow

on Kennedy's chances and greatly strengthened Stevenson's
cause.

9

Khruschev had made a spectacular visit to America in
1959--the first Soviet ruler ever to do so--and had a congenial meeting with Eisenhower at the President's retreat
at Camp David.

Khruschev invited Eisenhower to visit Russia,

and the two men agreed to meet with British Prime Minister
Macmillan and French President de Gaulle to discuss Berlin,
arms control, and other troublesome issues' 4t was decided
AT ll r1t1,.s

that-the summit conference would be held in ·Par-is in May, 1960.
On May 5, 1960--less than a fortnight before the meeting-Khruschev announced in Moscow that an American plane, a U-2,
had been brought down in Russia.

The U.

s.

State Department

and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration said
that it must have been a weather research plane which accidently strayed off course.

Having caught the American govern-

ment in a lie, Khruschev announced on May 7 that the plane had
been 1200 miles inside Russian territory and that the pilot
of the plane was alive and had confessed to being on a spy
mission; still, Khruschev refused to blame President Eisenhower, saying instead that the Pentagon was behind the action.
The State Department conceded that the plane was on an
espionage mission but added that the flight had not been
authorized by "higher authorities''

(i.e., the President).

Eisenhower, apparently apparently insulted by the assertions
that he was unaware of what was going on in the U. S. government, issued a statement accepting full responsibility for
the flight; not only that, but he indicated that such flights
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would continue.

Then the President ordered a world-wide

alert of U. S. combat forces.
When the "Big Four" gathered in Paris, the atmosphere
was tense.

At the first meeting on May 16, Khruschev de-

manded that Eisenhower publicly apologize for the U-2 flight
and promise that there would be no such occurrences in the
future.

Eisenhower refused; Khruschev publicly withdrew the

invitation to visit Russia and announced that no fruitful
conference could take place until a new President of the United
States had been elected.

Calling a press conference later,

Khruschev--in the most violent display of public temper since
Hitler's tirades a generation before--accused the

u.

S. of

bad faith and insulted Eisenhower with virtually every
epithet he could summon up.
destroy the U.

s.

In addition, he threatened to

missile bases and drive the West out of

Berlin.

/u

T1ry1r.JC-

On May 16, Stevenson was I\ in Washington

-~o

test-i-f-y before

a Senate committee on the need for televised debates during
the Presidential campaign.

Even while he was testifying,

word had reached the U. S. of the acrimonious end of the summit conference; when he left the hearing room, Stevenson was
mobbed by newsmen asking his political plans.

He then met

with Lyndon Johnson and other Democratic Congressional leaders
who told him that, due to the international situation, he
might once again be the Democratic candidate for President.

14
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Afterwards, Stevenson conferred with Senator Monroney.
Monroney asked that Stevenson continue to speak out on the
vital issues and that he do nothing to hinder the ''Draft
Stevenson" movement.

Stevenson agreed.

15

The U-2 crisis

had indeed enhanced Stevenson's chances and diminished
iT

Kennedy's, for

~He-c~isis

had prompted people to wonder

whether Kennedy was too inexperienced for the great responsibilities of the Presidency.
The events in Paris and the humiliation Eisenhower had
been forced to undergo had also created a clamor for national
unity.

Stevenson was infuriated, for he felt that whenever

the Eisenhower Administration co1mnitted a blunder, the
Republicans immediately attempted to stifle criticism by
appealing for "national unity."
Consequently, speaking at the Cook County Democratic
dinner in Chicago on May 19, Stevenson discussed the U-2
crisis and the Paris summit meeting.

He deplored the boorish

behavior of Khruschev and blamed him for wrecking the meeting,
but he went on to say that there were certain "hard, inescapable facts" which could not be ignored:

Khruschev had wrecked

the summit but the American government's clumsy mistakes had
given him the "crowbar and sledgehammer" with which to do it.
"We cannot sweep this whole sorry mess under the rug in
the name of national unity;• he stated, and he charged further
.that this administration had played
into Khruschev's hands; that if Khruschev
wanted to wreck the conference, our government made
it possible; that the administration acutely
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embarrassed our allies and endangered our bases;
that they have helped make successful
negotiations with the Russians--negotiations
that are vital to our survival--impossible so
long as they are in power.16
This speech aroused a storm of controversy:

I

was accused of appeasement and for treason.

17

Stevenson

But he had

forced a discussion of the issue.
In fact, he was praised by many for having the moral
courage to speak his thoughts.

Some newspapers such as the

St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Denver Post, Milwaukee Journal, and
18
• nomina
• t ion.
•
l.T~ew y or k P os t ca 11 ed. f or h is

So did Walter

Lippmann, the dean of American political commentators, whose
influence among liberals was enormous; Lippmann stated that a
Stevenson-Kennedy ticket would be the most viable alternative
to the Republicans.

He said that

Stevenson has been the successful governor
of a big state, has had considerable experience
in diplomacy, has had a deep indoctrination
in American affairs in two grueling campaigns
against an unbeatable opponent, and, all
in all, is greatly respected in all the corners
of the globe.19
THt

In keeping witlv\"statesman" image his followers were
promoting, Stevenson, in a speech on June 1, announced a
"grand strategy for peace":
a) abandon the Dulles concept of "massive
retaliation" for a more flexible military response;
b) strengthen the political and economic unity
of NATO by establishing an Atlantic Council;
c) Pool the financial and technical resources
of the Atlantic community to aid the underdeveloped world;
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d) work for ''general and complete" disarmament,
beginning with a suspension of nuclear
testing;
e) show the world what a vigorous democracy
can do, by having the Federal government
tackle the urgent problems of education,
housing, health, urban renewal, civil
rights, etc.20
Stevenson was presenting this as a Democratic program,
but it struck some--including the Kennedys--as being a
Stevenson program.

This impression was confirmed when, a few

days later, James Doyle formally announced the formation of
a ''Draft Stevenson" organization.

By the end of the month,

''Draft Stevenson" groups existed in forty-two states, and
money was flowing in to pay for newspaper advertisements and

.
l'iterature. 21
campaign
However, it is now necessary to examine Stevenson's
relationship with John F. Kennedy.

III
Stevenson and Kennedy had not known each other intimately
before 1960, but their relations had always been friendly.
Indeed, Kennedy, as a young freshman Senator, had placed
Stevenson's name in nomination at the 1956 convention.

How-

ever, in 1960, the two men were rivals, and their cordial relations could not help but suffer.
Kennedy, since 1956, had set his sights on 1960 as the
time for his drive for power.

Accordingly, he had built an

impressive political organization which worked for the single
purpose of electing John Kennedy President in 1960.

Under the

able direction of his younger brother Robert, this organization was, in terms of financial backing, unstinting work,
personal loyalty, and sheer political know-how, unparalleled
in American political history.
Kennedy's adroit touch as a politician was in contrast to
Stevenson's inept political efforts.

Stevenson, contrary to

popular thought, was not politically naive; he just had a
personal distaste for politics.
affairs and policy issues.

His real love was public

But, as journalist Theodore H.

White has pointed out, in America, public affairs and politics
are inescapably bound together.

White compared Stevenson's

15
unrealistic attitude--love of issues and indifference to
politics--to that of a man who deeply loves a woman but
22
hates sex.
As stated above, Stevenson hoped the convention would
come to him, as it had in 1952.

He failed to realize that

the political situation in 1960 was radically different from
1952.

Then, Stevenson had unquestionably been the "indis-

pensable man":

there was a genuine deadlock, and he was re-

garded as the best qualified man to be President and the only
Democrat who could run a strong race against Gene]'}\}. Eisenhower.
Now, in 1960, Kennedy was far ahead of the other candidates in
delegate votes 1

Stevenson was a two-time loser, and, while

Stevenson may well have been the best qualified man to be
President, it was by no means certain that he could run a
stronger race against the G.O.P. than Kennedy.
Still, despite his lead, Kennedy had long worried about
.
- . d acy. .. 23
Stevenson's "sleeping
candi

Kennedy was trying to win

the nomination as the liberal candidate, but he knew that
Stevenson had a strong following in the liberal wing of the
Party.

So Kennedy's hope was to induce Stevenson to

...forma-~ly

r-o G."' fl.'-'-Y

withdraw~from

contention and thus leave the liberal wing open

HI IV\

to Kennedy.
Kennedy knew that Stevenson's train of thought had turned
increasingly over the years to foreign relations and that, if
he could not be President, Stevenson desperately wanted to be
Secretary of State.

Kennedy played on this desire without

letup to win Stevenson over to him.

16
In April, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., was sent to tell
Stevenson that Kennedy would feel ''certain obligations" to
i.J £.'jClfl'iNC&

h'im

~h
.L.1..

.

FoR.

e-were

i-/1~

w

support -*enned-y-. 24

Several law partners of

Stevenson who were Kennedy supporters were constantly urging
Stevenson to be 'realistic'! support Kennedy and become
Secretary Of State. 25

th e Oregon primary
.
During
.
campaign,

Kennedy was quoted as saying that he "assumed"that any Democratic Administration would have Stevenson as Secretary of
26
State.
Stevenson still would not come into the Kennedy
camp.
Thus, Kennedy stopped by Stevenson's home in Libertyville,
Illinois, on his way back from Oregon.
Stevenson a quid pro quo deal:

He planned to offer

if Stevenson would formally

withdraw from the race, announce his support for Kennedy, and,
hopefully, place Kennedy's name in nomination at the convention,
then he--Kennedy--would promise Stevenson the post of Secretary
of State in the Kennedy cabinet.

Newton Minow, a law partner

of Stevenson and later Chairman of the Federal Communications
Commission, told Kennedy that such a proposal would be regarded
by Stevenson as a bribe and would only harden him in his
opposition. 27
was refused.

As it was, Kennedy asked for his support and

28
£). Pi...fl,t-Jc..o 111s {}t::c1s;o,.; ·ro

Stevenson

to-1-tr~Schlesinger

why he

had-~efused

Kennedy:

"It would look as if I were jumping on the bandwagon.
body would say,

Every-

'There's the deal we told you about.' It would

.
f or a JO
' b • 1129
look as if I were angling

Th ere were a 1 so t wo

L___

17
other factors which strongly motivated Stevenson:

his hope

of getting nomination himself and his low opinion of Kennedy.
During the course of 1960, Stevenson had come to regard
Kennedy as a brash upstart.

He realized that Kennedy had

great potential, but he thought that Kennedy lacked mature
judgment and, especially, humility; in addition, he deplored
what he considered to be Kennedy's ruthless pursuit of power.
Stevenson referred to Kennedy on one occasion as an "arrogant
young man. 1130
Similarly, Kennedy had lowered his opinion of Stevenson.
Although he respected Stevenson's ideas and intellectual
capacity, Kennedy felt that he was soft and namby-pamby,
lacking the toughness and powers of decision necessary for an
effective leader.

Furthermore, he was angered by Stevenson's

lofty, above-the-battle pose; he thought that Stevenson,
through hypocrisy, was trying to deny him the goal for which
he had labored so strenuously.
The Kennedy camp was increasingly apprehensive about
Stevenson as the July convention drew closer.

It was not at

all certain that Kennedy had enough delegate votes to win the
nomination, and an endorsement from Stevenson would surely tip
H1M.

the scales for -Kennedy.

Hence, Kennedy was determined to

bring Stevenson over to his side.
Previously, Kennedy had extended the carrot to Stevenson;
now he intended to apply the stick.

Having invited several

close friends of Stevenson to dinner at his Georgetown home

18
in June, Kennedy informed them that he was now undecided
as to whom he would appoint Secretary of State, and he said
pointedly that Stevenson had better join the
wagon or he would
big mistake."

31

KE,.._,.~y

band-

learn to his regret th~t he had made "a
This could not be taken as an 'idle threat,

as the Kennedys had already achieved a formidable reputation
for rewarding friends and ~unishing enemies.
Stevenson, at this same time, was being advised either
to declare himself in.the race or out of it; that this position
.1 t~/\I

of neutrality would not win him the nomination,

and~it

winning only contempt and hostility from.the Kennedys.
Stevenson refused to change his position.

32

was

IV
This is not the place for a detailed study of the
political machinations at the Democratic convention in Los
Angeles.

Stevenson's efforts to win the nomination can be

described simply as ineffectual.
Kennedy came to the convention far in the lead of the
other contenders; but he had little more than 600 votes out
of the 761 needed to win.
image as a

11

winner 11

,

Since his foremost asset was his

Kennedy knew that he must win on the

first ballot or he would not win at all.
Stevenson's strategists were also aware of this. fact.
As their early strategy had been to help Humphrey beat Kennedy
in the primaries, their strategy now was to deny Kennedy a
first ballot victory and deadlock the convention.

With each

succeeding ballot, Kennedy's strength would decline; the convention would have to turn to another man.
Symington, who had no popular support?

Who would he be?

Johnson, who was

vigorously opposed by the liberal and Northern Democrats?

It

was believed that the convention would turn to Stevenson, the
only one with the truly national stature of a President.
The Stevenson forces did not intend to enlist the support
of the party professionals; they hoped to emulate the miracle

20
of 1940 when Wendell Willkie received the Republican
nomination by a stampede of popular pressure.

There were

heavy pro-Stevenson demonstrations around .the Sports Arena
where the convention was meeting,

33

the galleries were

packed with Stevenson supporters, and the delegates were
deluged with telegrams

u~ng them to support Stevenson. 34

The main barrier to the success of the Stevenson movement remained Stevenson himself.

A prominent delegate re-

marked that "if Adlai had declared as a candidate, he would
be unbeatable now.''

35

However, except for a statement early

in July to the effect that he would accept the nomination if
he was drafted,

36

stevenson still refused to commit himself to

the race and passed up a number of opportunities to win.
The crucial delegations from Pennsylvania, California,
Minnesota, and New York were known to have strongly proStevenson elements.

If Stevenson had indicated a willingness

to run, he might have drawn enough votes to prevent a Kennedy
victory, but, again, he refused.
When Stevenson appeared on the convention floor on the
day before the balloting, bedlam broke out.

For twenty minutes·

delegates and gallery spectators chanted "We want Stevenson!''
Stewart Udall, a Kennedy delegate from Arizona and later
Secretary of the Interior, said that "after about eight 'minutes,
some of us got a funny feeling in the stomach that it might be
Willkie all over again. 1137

Stevenson was called to the podium

to speak to the crowd, but he spoke only a few pleasantries

21
and left.

As Monroney later wrote, Stevenson "had but to

say 'I seek your nomination, I need your help.'

He did not

say it. 1138
His lackluster performance did not inspire the convention
to come to him.

Kennedy won his victory on the first ballot;

Stevenson received only 79 1/2 votes. 39
The battle for the nomination left bitterness in the
Kennedy camp towards Stevenson, who was always regarded as
their greatest threat.

When Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., tried to

persuade Robert Kennedy to make peace with the Stevensonians,
Kennedy cut him off, saying: 11 • • • Adlai has given us a rough
time • • . right now, I don't want to hear anything about the
Stevensonians.
The bitterness was not one-sided either.

Anger was so

deep among the die-hard Stevensonians that many of them planned
to sit out the election, on the grounds that there was no
difference between Kenndy and Richard Nixon, the Republican
candidate.

Stevenson, though, had become convinced of Kennedy's

liberalism, and, since he despised Nixon, he attempted to rectify
the situation.

In September and October, Stevenson delivered

over seventy speeches across the country to the faithful,
telling them that there was indeed a difference between KenJay
and Nixon, that Kennedy stood for the principles for which they
fought in 1952 and 1956.
successful.

In this task, he was largely

22
Stevenson may have lost the battle (i.e., the Presidency}, but he won the war, in the sense that his ideas
became the accepted thinking by Americans of both parties.
One has only to look at the platforms of the respective
parties in 1960 to ascertain Stevenson's profound influence:
both called for the suspension of nuclear testing, both
stressed greater technical and economic aid to the underdeveloped nations, and the Democratic platform stressed
international arms control

41

--all Stevenson proposals which

had earlier been scorned as "soft on Communism."
Stevenson's influence could also be seen in the rhetoric
employed by John Kennedy during the campaign.

During the

Truman years, the Democratic Party had followed a campaign
policy of 'bread and circuses', as exemplified in the slogan,
"you never had it so good.

11

Stevenson, in the period of

1952-60, spoke on a far different level, saying that Americans
must be self-critical and disciplined to be the moral leaders
of the free world.

He hammered on this theme despite--or

because of--the easy complacency of the 1950's.

By 1960,

the American people were ready to listen, if not to Stevenson,
to Kennedy.
It is interesting to compare the rhetoric of the two men:
Stevenson, 1952-The ordeal of the Twentieth Century--the bloodiest,
most turbulent era of the Christian age--is far
from over. Sacrifice, patience, understanding,
and implacable purpose may be our lot for years
to come. Let's face it. Let's talk sense to
the American people. Let's tell them the truth,

23

that there are no gains without pains, that
we are now on the eve of great decisions, not
easy decisions. •
42
Kennedy, 1960-The old era is ending. The old ways will not
do . • • the problems are not solved and the battles
are not all won--and we stand today on the edge of
a New Frontier • • • But the New Frontier of which
I speak is not a set of promises--it is a set of
challenges. It sums up, not what I intend
to offer the American peopLe, but what I intend
to ask of them.
It appeals to their pride,
not their pocketbooks--it holds out the promise
of more sacrifice instead of more security.43
Kennedy, of course, won in November, and Stevenson paid
for his "big mistake."

Having previously "assumed" that

Stevenson was the best qualified man to be Secretary of State,
Kennedy now suddenly discovered that Stevenson was "too controversial" for the post.
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Thus, Stevenson received the

subordinate position of Ambassador to the United Nations, while
the obscure Dean Rusk was chosen to head the State Department.
A Kennedy intimate remarked that if Stevenson had supported
Kennedy before the convention, "he could have had anything.
He could have been Secretary of State.

He could have even

been Vice-President. 1145
The remaining years of Stevenson's life (as U. N.
Ambassador) were filled with bitterness and frustration.
ever, this study ends. with 19 60.

How-

v
It is clear in retrospect that Stevenson's vacillation
throughout 1960 ruined his chances of becoming either
President or Secretary of State.

If he desired to be Presi-

dent, then he should have fought for the nomination; if he
desired rather to be Secretary of State, then he should have
supported Kennedy.

From a purely practical point-of-view,

Stevenson's political performance was pitiful.
In addition, the selfish implications of his actions
(or non-actions) cannot be ignored.

Since he clearly did not

intend to make any effort to win· the nomination and was fat(ly
certain that Kennedy would win,
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it is difficult to under-

stand how, in good conscience, he could have allowed so many
people to have given so freely of their time, efforts and
money in his behalf.
In the long run, however, Stevenson's contributions to
. .
""~~ f ar f rom s l'ig h t.
American history and po 1 itics
were

During

the dark, shameful period of McCarthyism, he--almost alone
among

u. s.

political leaders--held up the light of reason

and tolerance; his articulate criticisms of .the Dulles foreign
policy have been proven by time to be valid; and he laid the
groundwork for Kennedy's

~ew

Frontier and Johnson's Great

25
Society.

In his thinking on major issues, Stevenson was

years ahead of his time.

But would his ideas alone have

made him a great President?
An outstanding President must combine the roles of
statJman and pragmatic politican, as is seen most clearly in
the cases of Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt.
have successfully played the two roles?

Could Stevenson

Could Stevenson have

persuaded Congress and the general public to register approval
of his prescient ideas?
Perhaps, in the final analysis, Stevenson's greatest
contribution would not have been in the exercise of power
but in the role which was alloted him:
"prophet."

critic, educator,
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